The Russian Bear used to use its military might to keep its European neighbors in check, but today Russia’s natural resources are being wielded by Moscow as the weapons of choice.
Europe has grown increasingly dependent on Russian oil – and especially natural gas – to power its economies. In fact, Russia really has a strangle-hold on fast-growing Eastern and Central European nations, with state-owned Gazprom holding all the cards.
According to a recent article in The Economist magazine, Poland Hungry, and the Czech Republic each depend on Mother Russia for more than 60% of their natural gas imports – while Bulgaria gets nearly ALL of its gas from Russia. In Western Europe, more than 40% of Germany’s gas imports come from Russia, while in Italy and France the figures are 30% and 20% respectively.
Calling the Shots in European Natural Gas
With its business largely controlled by the Kremlin, Gazprom generates $22 billion a year in profits from gas exports to European customers. By some estimates, nearly one-fourth of total global natural gas consumption is supplied by this company. The word “monopoly” just doesn’t do justice in describing the vast extent of Gazprom’s dominance over energy markets in the region.
Since almost 60% of the world's gas is concentrated in just three countries – Russia, Iran and Qatar – Gazprom is in position to control not only a majority of production – but also the flow of gas supplies (through its pipelines) from anywhere in Central Asia to customers throughout Europe.
Gazprom built this natural gas empire at the behest of – and with significant aid from – the Russian government. President Putin sees the company as a national crown jewel, even saying publicly that the company is a “powerful lever of economic and political influence in the world”.
Gazprom’s Bare-Knuckle Business Tactics
Gazprom has grown by acquisition, mainly through coercive tactics, by taking ownership stakes in other energy companies both inside and outside Russia’s borders. Making a series of offers that firms just can’t refuse, Gazprom has assumed nearly total control of the country’s natural gas production and distribution infrastructure.
One hapless independent energy firm in Siberia, Northgas, was persuaded to give up a 51% interest in its company to Gazprom in 2005, after repeated disputes with the company over pipelines. A company official is quoted by the Economist as saying “it’s better to have 49% of an enterprise that works, than 100% of one that doesn’t”, well said.
Around this time last year, Gazprom created quite a stir by turning off the supply of natural gas to Ukraine in a dispute over transmission fees for gas flowing through Russian pipelines across Ukrainian territory. These pipelines, most originally built by the former Soviet Union, crisscross Europe like the tentacles of an octopus – and now reach nearly every corner of the continent.
Controlling the Flow of Energy and Political Clout
Needless to say, whoever controls these pipelines controls the flow of energy to Europe and can pretty much dictate price – this economic AND political power rests ultimately in the hands of Gazprom.
The monopoly powers that Gazprom wields – not to mention its high-handed business tactics – are making customers in the west understandably nervous.
After forcing many of its domestic rivals to knuckle-under – Gazprom is now trying to muscle-in on the western energy sector – while it puts the screws to competitors on its own home turf. In fact, Gazprom has already purchased stakes in gas distributors in Germany and the Baltic states, and owns a 10% interest in an Anglo-Belgian pipeline.
But while Gazprom is busy consolidating the domestic energy sector –and buying up western assets – Russia is also turning a cold-shoulder to foreign companies investing in the country.
Gazprom’s Dealings Scare-off Western Investment and Expertise
Royal Dutch Shell and other firms were recently pressured into surrendering a controlling interest in the huge Sakhalin fields in far-eastern Russia, after pouring billions into the development of the project, just as large-scale production was beginning. BP Plc has also been hamstrung in its development of another large gas field in Siberia.
And recently, the Russian government turned an auction of energy assets from the bankrupt Yukos into a total farce. The bidding was in-effect “rigged” to insure that all the plumb-assets went to Rosneft, another state-owned energy firm, or to Gazprom itself through western intermediaries (An Inside Job in Russian Oil Auction).
But these heavy-handed dealings with western firms, who bring not only capital but technological know-how to the table, may also backfire on the Kremlin.
Production at Gazprom’s three major gas fields are falling about 7% annually – a dilemma the company cannot afford – since these reserves account for 75% of its total output. And since it’s spending so much buying up European assets, Gazprom has less capital available to invest in exploration and production of newer reserves.
This declining production calls into question Gazprom’s grand strategy to become an even bigger supplier to global markets, since two-thirds of its production is already eaten up by Russian customers.
With domestic demand rising at a steady pace – European natural gas customers may be left out in the cold.